The paper examines the role of executive compensation in inducing management behavior that triggers private securities litigation. Incentive pay in the form of options is found to increase the probability of securities class action lawsuits, holding constant a wide range of other firm characteristics. In contrast, base pay levels and share ownership do not have a significant impact on lawsuit incidence. We further identify earnings manipulation as an important channel linking compensation and litigation: incentive pay has a significant impact on earnings manipulation, which in turn significantly affects the probability of litigation. However, our accrual-based measure of manipulation does not capture the full impact of compensation on litigation, suggesting other channels are important. Our results suggest that optionbased compensation may have the unintended side effect of giving executives an incentive to manipulate earnings and target the short term share price.
Introduction
Corporate governance has recently become an increasingly topical area of research in financial economics. The bursting of the stock market bubble of the late 90s has provided researchers with a unique opportunity to witness a series of severe consequences of corporate governance failures. Shareholder litigation in response to perceived mismanagement and fraud has Some recent observers have argued that many instances of stock price and earnings manipulation are attributable to executive compensation that is too strongly linked to short-term indicators of performance. Former SEC chairman Arthur Levitt (2002, p.111) describes the impact of the upsurge in the use of option-based compensation from the late 1990s onwards 3 as follows:
… the options craze created an environment that rewarded executives for managing the share price, not for managing the business. Options gave executives strong incentives to use accounting tricks to boost the share price on which their compensation depended.
Economists have long argued that a strong linkage between compensation and performance is essential for resolving the agency problem created by the separation of ownership and control.
Stock and option grants are natural ways to align executives' interests with shareholder value, as they are responsive to performance information that is reflected in the share price. However, until recently the theories have generally ignored the possibility that the stock price and other performance measures can be manipulated or falsified; it is becoming increasingly clear that this is a key issue in the design of managerial incentive contracts.
1 These numbers exclude filings relating to the allocation of shares in IPOs, as well as filings alleging that securities analysts or investment banks provided slanted research coverage (there was a huge burst of 312 IPO allocation filings in 2001, falling back to just one in 2002). 2 The maximum dollar loss is defined as the dollar value decrease in the defendant firm's market capitalization, from the trading day on which it reached its maximum during the class period to the trading day immediately following the end of the class period. Naturally, this figure balloons in the wake of a substantial market correction such as that of 2000-2001. 3 Hall and Murphy (2003) report that the value of stock option grants to CEOs of S&P 500 firms increased nine fold between 1992 and 2000, while other components of total compensation merely tripled.
The main objective of this paper is to study the incentive effects of top managers' compensation contracts and to investigate whether they may have unintended consequences. More specifically, we look at whether the various components of executive compensation are related to allegations of executive misbehavior in shareholder class action lawsuit filings. We find that stock option related components of compensation are positively and significantly associated with the incidence of such lawsuits, controlling for other factors such as firm and industry characteristics. In contrast, salary and share ownership are insignificant, while bonuses are only marginally significant.
Given that "failure to disclose material information" and accounting violations are often cited in the lawsuits 4 , we further investigate whether earnings manipulation, as measured by estimated discretionary accruals, is an important channel mediating this relationship. Our analysis shows that our earnings manipulation measure, and in particular that part of it that is induced by compensation, is highly significant in explaining fraud allegations.
Our results have important implications for the design of executive compensation contracts.
The objective of such contracts is to maximize long-term shareholder value. Options (and to a lesser extent bonuses) in their current form seem to provide incentives to target the short-term share price in ways that are not necessarily value-enhancing: manipulating performance measures such as accounting yardsticks and publicly disclosed price-sensitive information. Such self-dealing by executives may conflict with long-term shareholder value and can trigger shareholder class action lawsuits as well as SEC sanctions; and these outcomes are harmful in themselves in terms of legal fees, firm reputation and distracted management attention. At the very least, longer vesting periods and deferral of compensation may alleviate the problem: we find that vested options have the strongest association with class action lawsuits.
Our work also contributes to the evidence regarding the role of private securities litigation in identifying managerial fraud. Private class action litigation is an important disciplinary mechanism that distinguishes the U.S. capital markets from most others. While diffuse individual shareholders have no strong incentive to enforce good corporate governance, law firms have strong incentives to put together a class and sue on its behalf, since their fees can be a significant fraction of the damages recovered. However, it is widely felt that many such lawsuits are simply extortion devices triggered by any large share price drop, irrespective of its cause. We find that the incidence of private securities litigation is responsive to both managerial manipulation and the underlying incentives for it, a necessary condition for the effectiveness of class action litigation as a deterrent.
What is new about our work is the focus on a direct empirical link between executives' incentive pay and shareholder litigation. The existing literature connects accounting manipulation to shareholder litigation; we investigate the fundamental compensation related incentives for such behavior and their impact on litigation risk. A series of recent papers separately examine the relationship between executive pay and earnings manipulation. Our paper bridges and contributes to these two lines of inquiry.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the legal background for shareholder class action lawsuits, and summarizes the relevant empirical literature. Section 3 describes the data.
Section 4 presents the empirical analysis and results. Section 5 provides a concluding discussion.
Legal background and empirical literature 2.1 Legal background
Under the securities laws it is illegal to make materially false and misleading statements, or to trade stock as an insider when in possession of undisclosed material information. We will be using the incidence of shareholder class action lawsuits as an indicator of such abuses.
The two central pieces of legislation that are relevant to our study are the Securities Act of 1933 (SA 1933) , which regulates the process whereby companies make offerings of securities, and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (SEA 1934) , which is much broader in scope, covering all aspects of securities trading. The SEA 1934 imposes registration and reporting requirements on firms whose securities are traded on secondary markets, and regulates all parties involved in trading. Most of the securities laws' provisions for civil liability concern disclosure and registration requirements, together with a set specifically directed at manipulative practices.
The SEA 1934 outlaws deceptive and manipulative behavior and provides a private remedy for injured investors 5 . Its Section 10(b) empowers the SEC to put forth rules barring such manipulative and deceptive conduct. Rule 10b-5, the blanket antifraud rule promulgated in 1942 by 5 See Palmiter (2002) for an exposition of the full range of federal securities fraud remedies available.
the SEC, is the cornerstone of US securities regulation. It has been used aggressively by the federal courts to regulate not just fraud but also negligent securities practices and corporate mismanagement, though its reach has been pruned back in recent years. Since 1946 the federal courts have recognized a private cause of action under Rule 10b-5, and it is widely used as a basis for class action lawsuits because it is in some important ways less demanding than other remedies for securities fraud victims. In particular, if misinformation is disseminated in the securities markets there is a presumption of "reliance" 6 : the plaintiffs are not required to prove that they relied on the misinformation. In addition, actionable misinformation is not just restricted to what has been written down in mandated SEC filings; it can include false press releases, silence in the face of a duty to update, and statements by company officials.
But shareholder class action lawsuits are not limited to Rule 10b-5. Many actions are brought under sections 11 and 12 of the Securities Act of 1933, which cover fraudulent registration statements and, more broadly, noncompliance with registration rules and misrepresentation.
Because they relax the burden of proof for the plaintiff 7 , these are considered relatively more advantageous than 10b-5 litigation in those cases covered by SA 1933, namely situations in which a company makes a primary issue of securities (either an IPO or a seasoned offering) or when inside shareholders sell securities in conjunction with a primary offering. Express private causes of action are also available under Sections 18(a) and 9(e) of SEA 1934, against persons making false statements in filings and against willful participants in manipulative conduct respectively; however, they are generally considered less advantageous than Rule 10b-5 and therefore especially Section 18(a) is rarely used. 6 The civil liability schemes of the federal securities laws draw on and sometimes modify principles of the common law of misrepresentation. The tort of deceit has five elements, all of which must be proved by the party who seeks to recover: (i) misrepresentation of material fact (it must be important in deciding whether to enter into the transaction; opinions are not actionable; and silence is not actionable unless there is a duty to disclose); (ii) scienter (the maker of the misrepresentation must know or believe the facts are otherwise); (iii) reliance (the person seeking to recover must have actually and justifiably relied on the misrepresentation); (iv) causation (his pecuniary loss can reasonably be expected to result from the reliance); and (v) damages ("out-of-pocket" damages plus any consequential damages, and punitive damages in flagrant cases). See Palmiter (2002, §6.1.1) . See also Palmiter (2002, §6.1 .2) for a description of the common law basis for rescission (a contracting party may seek to rescind a deal if there is material misrepresentation of fact, even if it is not fraudulent; reliance must be proved, but scienter and loss causation need not be proved). 7 There is no need to prove scienter (deliberate fraud or reckless disregard by defendant), reliance (plaintiff relied on the misinformation in his decision to buy the securities) and causation (the plaintiff's loss was caused by the fraud).
The remedies available to plaintiffs depend somewhat on the litigation strategy used. 8 In general, the formula used attempts to capture the damages sustained by the plaintiff; the goal of liability is compensation, not punitive damages. Clearly, a necessary condition for a nonnegligible remedy is a substantial stock price movement between the times when the initial transaction takes place and when corrective disclosures are made.
Since 1991 the federal limitations period for 10b-5 actions has been brought into line with that for other private actions explicitly authorized in SEA 1934 and SA 1933 . The limitation period is one year: action must be brought within one year after discovery of the facts constituting the violation (or within one year after they could reasonably have been ascertained). The repose period is three years: the action must be commenced within three years of the violation.
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA 1995), enacted over President Clinton's veto, was expressly designed to discourage frivolous securities litigation, and in particular Rule 10b-5 class actions. Ways in which it has made such litigation more onerous are: a requirement that the lead plaintiff be the "most adequate plaintiff" 9 , procedural obstacles, the shifting of defendants' attorneys' fees to the plaintiff if the complaint lacks substantial legal or factual support, limits on attorneys' fees, full and detailed disclosure of any settlement, and reduced liability for unknowing violators (such as outside directors). In 1998 Congress curtailed jurisdiction shopping by requiring that class actions involving allegations of securities fraud be brought exclusively in federal, not state, courts. In addition, since a landmark Supreme Court decision in 1994, the liability of "aiders and abettors", such as accountants who certify false financial statements and lawyers who advise on fraudulent schemes, has been severely curtailed.
Whilst discouraging baseless suits, these reforms also weaken the role of private securities class action as a complement to government actions in deterring securities fraud. But such deterrence is already compromised by the fact that generally the cases are settled out of court without admissions of guilt, because fraud charges are extremely difficult to prove; moreover, the settlements are largely paid out by the company itself and/or by D&O (directors and officers) 8 For example, under Section 12(a) of SA 1933, the remedy is rescission of the securities purchase or broadly equivalent compensation. Under Section 11 of SA 1933, damages for direct purchasers in an offering are based on the difference between the offer price and either the sale price or the security's price at the time of the lawsuit, depending on whether or not the claimant's shares were subsequently sold (for aftermarket purchasers, damages are based on the lower of the offer price and the price at which the security was bought). Under Rule 10b-5, the remedy is somewhat malleable, but most commonly out-of-pocket damages calculated in a similar way. 9 Discouraging "professional plaintiffs" who hold tiny investments in many companies and lend their names to securities lawyers, in return for a fee, whenever there are stock price swings.
insurers. Thus the executives involved generally escape jail time and even financial sanctions, though their reputation and career prospects do suffer.
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Empirical research
Empirical research in law and economics has identified a number of predictors of shareholder litigation. The objective of our paper is to focus on the underlying incentives for the managerial actions that trigger allegations of manipulation and fraud in private securities litigation.
The existing literature tends to start from measures of the manipulative behavior itself, as well as general characteristics of the firms involved, as determinants of the incidence of private securities class action litigation.
Studies that focus directly on the impact of aggressive accounting on the incidence of litigation include Johnson, Nelson and Pritchard (2002) , who document that variables capturing aggressive accounting choices (such as restatements, abnormal accruals, and sales growth) are related to the risk of a class action. They find that the statistical relationship between such variables and the incidence of securities fraud litigation has become stronger since the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, suggesting that suits have become more merit based. Lu (2003) finds that over the period 1988-2000, her measure of earnings management is associated with allegations of manipulation over the same period in subsequent private securities litigation; it is also a significant predictor of the size of the settlement at the conclusion of such cases. DuCharme et al.
(2003) limit their attention to firms issuing stock; they also find that abnormal accounting accruals are significantly positively related to subsequent litigation. Heninger (2001) finds a positive relation between income-increasing abnormal accruals and the incidence of lawsuits against firm auditors.
Insider trading provides a possible incentive to withhold or falsify information. Niehaus and Roth (1999) study insider selling in cases filed before PSLRA 1995 and find that during class periods top company insiders do not sell significantly more stock than they usually do. Johnson, Nelson and Pritchard (2002) We turn now to the empirical literature on the incentives for accounting manipulation and securities fraud. Early work dating from before the widespread use of option-based compensation focuses on the impact of bonus schemes. Healy (1985) and Guidry et al. (1999) find evidence that indeed managerial accounting decisions are related to the incentives provided by their bonus contracts; Holthausen et al. (1995) also find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that managers manipulate earnings downwards when their bonuses are at their maximum, though Gaver et al. (1995) argue that income-smoothing, possibly motivated by a desire to make the company appear less risky, better describes the data.
More recent work includes equity-based compensation among the determinants of accounting manipulation. Both Bergstresser and Philippon (2002) and Gao and Shrieves (2002) find that earnings manipulation, as measured by the absolute value of discretionary current accruals, is significantly related to the incentives provided by stock and option packages held by executives.
Cheng and Warfield (2003) There is also a growing body of evidence relating the timing of options grants and exercise decisions to patterns of abnormal stock returns. There are clear signs of self-dealing behavior in the timing of disclosures around option grants (Yermack, 1997 and Aboody and Kasznik, 2000) :
favorable news seems to be delayed until after the strike prices have been determined, as evidenced by higher post-grant returns. Similarly, Baker et al. (2003) document income-decreasing earnings management for firm with earnings announcements preceding option grant dates. In term of insider selling, Huddart and Lang (2003) find that the level of employee option exercise activity is abnormally high in advance of low stock returns over the subsequent half year.
The data
Our sample consists of all firms that have executive compensation data available in the Table 2 summarizes the time line of lawsuits. The median lawsuit in our sample has a class period of 274 days, and the median number of days from the starting date of the class period to the date when the lawsuit is filed is 381 days. This time line varies a lot across lawsuits: 25% of the lawsuits have a class period of less than 133 days and another 25% of the lawsuits have a class period of more than 499 days. Regarding the delay between the start of the class period and the filing date, 25% of lawsuits are filed in less than 190 days, while another 25% are not filed until more than 648 days after. with the greatest incidence of lawsuits filed is the "telecommunications" industry, closely followed by "business equipment" which includes computers, software and electronic equipment (this industry alone, with 152 lawsuits, accounts for 32% of all filings). Roughly a third of all firms in these two industries are sued during our sample period. The next most lawsuit-prone industry is "healthcare", where the number of sample-period lawsuits is just over a quarter of the number of firms in the industry (11% of the lawsuits in our sample come from this industry). "Utilities", "shops" (including wholesale, retail and some services), "other: industry" ("everything else": mines, construction, building materials, transport, hotels, business services, entertainment) and "finance"
are moderately lawsuit-prone (15-20% incidence within the industry); as these industries are fairly numerous, they each account for roughly 10% of the filings in our sample. Lawsuits are least common in the "energy", "chemicals", "manufacturing" and "durables" industries over this period.
To match the class action periods with incentive and earnings management variables that are available by fiscal year, we convert the class action periods into fiscal years based on the "fiscal year end" information from Compustat. Multiple class actions against the same firm and for the same fiscal year are counted as one observation. Table 4 describes the number of firms in a class period (a period about which allegations are filed) for each fiscal year 16 . From Table 4 we can see that the class periods start as early as fiscal year 1990, but this is unusual, as normally a 3-year limitation period applies and cases filed any later are likely to be dismissed. Given that the lawsuit filing data in our sample start in 1996 and the average number of days between the lawsuit filing date and the start date of the class period is 471, we choose to focus our study on observations activities during that year identified in a post-PSLRA lawsuit, our CLASSYEAR dummy is set to a value of one (zero otherwise). 17 The full sample average of CLASSYEAR is 4.7%.
Executive compensation and incentive measures
Our measures of incentives for company executives are constructed using the Compustat Executive Compensation (ExecuComp) database. This database contains compensation information for the five most highly paid executives for 2507 companies that are (were) members of the S&P 1500 starting fiscal year 1992. To capture the incentives for the top executives, we look at the aggregate compensation of the top five managers, not just the CEO. This seems appropriate because the cooperation of the executives as a team is generally required to implement any major decisions, whether in real operation of the firm or in "cooking the books", that could be driven by compensation-related incentives. Another reason we choose to focus on all top five executives rather than the CEO alone is that the CEO identifier is only available for 78% of the companies in the ExecuComp data set. For robustness, we repeated our analysis using the incentive measures for company CEOs alone; the results are very similar.
The compensation and incentive variables we use are the following: salary, bonuses, share ownership, and incentives from options. SALARY and BONUS capture the cash component of executive pay. Larger bonus relative to salary indicates that executive pay is more sensitive to performance as measured by various accounting yardsticks. We focus on the dollar amount of SALARY and BONUS in the paper. We also considered two alternative measures of salary and bonus in our analysis, scaling them by total cash compensation and by the market value of the company.
They all yield similar results.
The share ownership variable (SHAREOWN) is the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by the top five executives. On the one hand, higher share ownership alleviates agency problems by aligning the incentives of executives with shareholder value maximization. On the other hand higher share ownership, because it increases the sensitivity of executive wealth to the share price, may create incentives to manipulate short-term stock prices. 18 Such behavior could be associated with insider stock sales around times when stock prices are ramped up, and possibly stock awards to management at times when stock is undervalued.
would like to measure the option-related incentives as the sensitivity of executive option-related pay to changes in firm value 19 :
option related pay firm value
which can be expressed as:
number of options *option delta total number of shares outstanding (2) ExecuComp does not provide the information needed to compute the executives' portfolio option delta; and we do not attempt to do so. 20 The sensitivity of executives' option-related pay to changes in firm value is proxied by the number of options (i.e. the number of shares involved) as a percentage of the total number of shares outstanding. This creates four variables denoted as OPTVESTED (exercisable or vested options), OPTUNVESTED (unexercisable or unvested options),
OPTEXERCISE (options exercised) and OPTGRANT (options granted). Our ratio variables are only
appropriate measures of the sensitivity of executive pay to firm value to the extent that the option delta within each of the four items does not vary too much, either cross-sectionally or over time. In this respect the new option grants (OPTGRANT) are likely to be a less noisy proxy than the other variables, because they are more likely to be close to at-the-money, and to have similar maturities, so that there is less cross-sectional variation in the option deltas. Table 5 Panel A describes firm characteristics and incentive variables. The original distributions of these variables are highly positively skewed and have high kurtosis. We windsorize 19 We also checked the robustness of our results using alternative measures of option related incentives. First, we attempted to proxy the elasticity of option related pay with respect to the share price: option related pay total compensation firm value firm value ∆ ∆ , which can also be expressed as number of options*stock price * option delta total compensation That is, we rescaled the number of vested, unvested, exercised and granted options by multiplying by the stock price and dividing by the total compensation. Again, this measure is only valid to the extent that the option delta does not vary drastically cross-sectionally. Since the value of executive option portfolios is impossible to measure using the available data, we use the total cash compensation to proxy for total compensation. We obtain similar results in our analysis with this alternative measure of option related incentives.
Second, Baker and Hall (1998) argue that in many situations the best measure of compensation-related incentives is not the $ for $ sensitivity of executive pay to firm value, but the $ change in executive pay per % change in firm value, which can be written as: number of options*stock price * option delta . Again, our results are insensitive to the use of this alternative measure (with, again, delta held constant). 20 See Core and Guay (2002) 
Aggressive accounting proxies
The earnings reported in financial statements comprise both cash flows from operations and accruals; and the latter are particularly vulnerable to manipulation. To identify abnormal accruals while adjusting for industry or firm specific business conditions, we follow the method of Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998a) to decompose accruals into a nondiscretionary component that is necessary and expected by investors, and a discretionary component that is more likely to be a result of managerial manipulation. We consider both current accruals (CA), that is adjustments involving short-term assets and liabilities relating to day-to-day operations of the firm, and total accruals (TAC), which include both current and long-term accruals (involving long-term assets such as depreciation, deferred taxes, etc.). Teoh et al.'s (1998a) method of measuring discretionary accruals essentially applies a modification of the Jones (1991) model in a cross-sectional context: for each industry and fiscal year, accrual measures are regressed on explanatory variables representing firm conditions, and in particular, on sales growth. The discretionary and non-discretionary components are then constructed using the coefficient estimates: the nondiscretionary accruals are the fitted accruals, after adjusting sales growth for accounts receivable; the remainder is the discretionary component.
The details of this procedure are described in Appendix 1. We use discretionary current accruals (DCA), discretionary total accruals (DTAC) and their absolute values |DCA| and |DTAC| as measures of earnings management. 
Controls
To control for other economic factors that are not captured by incentive or accrual variables but that may influence the probability of litigation, we use the following variables: firm size, book to market, leverage, volatility, industry, and year. SIZE is the logarithm of the market capitalization of the firm, BM is the ratio of book value of equity to market capitalization. LEVERAGE is the ratio of total debt to total assets. 22 VOLATILITY is the standard deviation of daily stock returns for the fiscal year, annualized assuming 252 trading days per year. We divide our firms into 12 industries based on Kenneth French's SIC-based classification scheme. 
Analysis and results
Relationship of incentive compensation and lawsuits
We are interested in whether the incentives provided in executive compensation contracts give rise to managerial self-dealing that ultimately triggers class action litigation. Our focus in this paper is the behavior of managers and their underlying incentives, not that of class action lawyers or plaintiffs. We do not attempt to predict the date when a class action lawsuit will be filed; instead, we focus on predicting whether any particular year includes (any part of) a class period for a subsequent lawsuit.
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This approach precludes the use of post-class period variables, and in particular subsequent stock price drops, as explanatory variables: even though a substantial stock price drop is an excellent predictor of a class action filing, such is a drop is to some extent a consequence, not a cause, of securities laws violations. 21 For DTAC and DCA, part of the noise comes from estimation error in that these two variables are residuals from accrual regressions. 22 Calculated as [short-term debt (Compustat item 34) + long-term debt (Item 9)] / total assets. 23 Our results are not sensitive to the exclusion of the finance industry. 24 As a practical matter, the period of delay between any fraudulent activity and the date of its discovery and the filing of a lawsuit is inherently variable. 
Note that we use lagged executive compensation variables for the previous year to capture the exante incentives for managerial activity that may result in litigation. In contrast, we use the options exercised for the same year, as it captures the potential payoff from contemporaneous deceptive activities.
We estimate a pooled Probit regression using maximum likelihood, with
Huber/White/sandwich robust standard errors allowing for heteroskedasticity and firm level serial correlation. The resulting coefficient estimates and t-statistics are given in Table 6 . Given that the simple coefficient estimates for Probit models do not directly describe the economic effect of the independent variables, we also include (in the last column, labeled ∆Prob) the change in the probability when the independent variable changes from minus one standard deviation to plus one standard deviation around its mean, holding other variables constant at their respective means.
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The regression analysis finds clear differences in the impact of the various components of executive pay. SALARY is insignificant, as expected: the amount is fixed (and, moreover, lagged one year), so that it should not provide an incentive for any activities that invite litigation.
Managers' ownership of company stock SHAREOWN has no significant effect on lawsuit incidence.
Long-term share ownership aligns managements' and shareholders' interests, discouraging manipulative behavior. But to the extent that shares can be sold in the short term, share ownership might provide incentives for stock price manipulation.
The impact of BONUS on the class-year probability is positive but insignificant. High levels of bonus relative to salary in year t-1 could indicate that executive pay in the company in question is very sensitive to earnings or other accounting yardsticks of performance, and this sensitivity would be likely to persist into future years. Thus managers are given an incentive to boost firm 25 For dummy variables, ∆Prob is the difference in the c.d.f. when the dummy variable changes from 0 to 1.
performance, real or fictional, in the subsequent year. However, we do not find such an effect to be significant.
The number of vested options relative to total shares outstanding (OPTVESTED) is significant and quantitatively important. A change from minus to plus one standard deviation around the mean of OPTVESTED (1.5% of total shares outstanding) induces a 0.9%-point increase in the class-year probability for the following year. This suggests that the more exercisable options managers have, the more incentive they have to manipulate the firm's stock price in the short run, thus triggering litigation.
The second significant option-related compensation variable in our regression is OPTGRANT, the number of options granted relative to total shares outstanding in year t-1. A change from minus one standard deviation to plus one standard deviation around the mean of OPTGRANT increases the class year probability by 0.7%-point. There are several reasons why
OPTGRANT could increase the CLASSYEAR probability. First, even though most of these newly granted options do not vest immediately in the following year, some accounting tricks may be used to set the stage for an inflated stock price in later years, for example by the use of a "big bath" or "cookie jar reserves" to enhance earnings down the road and create the appearance of a high-growth business, as described in Section 4.2 below. Second, there is an incentive to manipulate share prices downward around the time when options are granted, as the exercise price is generally set at the current fair market value of the stock; such manipulation may either persist or rebound in the following year. Indeed self-dealing behavior in accounting and the timing of disclosures around option grants has been documented by Yermack (1997) , Aboody and Kasznik (2000) and Baker et al. (2003) . Third, even though OPTGRANT is just a subset of OPTUNVESTED (newly granted options typically have a vesting period of three years or longer), there is reason to expect it to have additional predictive power. As mentioned earlier in the data description, OPTVESTED and OPTUNVESTED are noisy measures of the performance sensitivity of executive pay coming from option portfolios. Newly granted options are more likely to be closer to the strike price than old options since executive options are usually granted at the money. The delta for an at-the-money option only depends on its return volatility, its time to maturity and the interest rate. As a result, there is less cross-sectional variation in delta for newly granted options after controlling for industry, size and book to market. Consequently, OPTGRANT is a less noisy measure of the sensitivity of executive option-related pay to underlying firm value compared to both OPTVESTED and OPTUNVESTED.
The number of unvested options relative to total shares outstanding (OPTUNVESTED) is positive but insignificant when industry and year controls are included. This could be because the impact of OPTUNVESTED is loaded onto the OPTGRANT variable, as we explain above.
Alternatively, the payoff from unvested options is often quite distant, though it should be noted that some of the options that have not yet vested at the close of the previous fiscal year may become vested in the course of the year of inquiry.
We also include the current-year exercise of options in our analysis. OPTEXERCISE is the number of options exercised relative to total shares outstanding in year t; this variable is insignificant, possibly because its impact is subsumed by that of OPTVESTED.
Of the control variables, SIZE (the log of market value), LEVERAGE and VOLATILITY are all significant. BM (the book to market ratio) is marginally significant. SIZE is highly significant and positive: when SIZE changes from minus one standard deviation to plus one standard deviation around the mean, the class-year probability in the following fiscal year is 4.7%-points higher.
Larger firms are more likely to be the target of litigation, not necessarily because they are more likely to engage in fraudulent behavior, but because they are more promising targets in terms of potential payoffs. This result is consistent with the literature: Alexander (1991), Jones and Weingram (1996a and b) and Strahan (1998) all find a strong positive relationship between firm size and litigation risk. The coefficient of VOLATILITY is also positive and very significant: the corresponding change in the class-year probability is 2.8%-points. More volatile firms are more likely to experience a large price drop, ensuring that potential damages are large enough to sustain the cost of bringing a suit. LEVERAGE is again significantly positive, agreeing with Strahan's (1998) findings. A minus one standard deviation to plus one standard deviation change increases the probability of litigation by 1.3%-point. There are at least two possible reasons why high leverage is associated with high litigation risk: it may be associated with higher future operating risk, and thus a higher probability of a large price drop; and it may simply indicate a recent history of poor performance, asset write-downs or forced heavy borrowing, fueling shareholder dissatisfaction.
Lastly, BM is weakly negative: a change from minus one standard deviation to plus one standard deviation around the mean of BM results in a 0.8%-point decrease in the class year probability, possibly indicating that high growth firms, or firms with more intangible assets, are easier to manipulate and hence more likely to be sued. In contrast, the only paper in the literature that also examines BM, Strahan (1998) , finds that firms with high book-to-market ratios in 1990 are more likely to be sued in 1991 to 1998; he views a low q as a sign of mismanagement, which can induce shareholder lawsuits.
Industry and year dummies add additional explanatory power to the regression. All coefficients for industry dummies are relative to the industry 12 (everything else). Industries 3 (manufacturing), 4 (energy) and 5 (chemicals) have lower probability of litigation 26 . Surprisingly, the three industries that have the highest lawsuit incidence in Table 3 -industries 6 (computers, software, etc.), 7 (telecommunications) and 10 (healthcare) -do not have a significantly higher probability of litigation in our regression; inclusion of the VOLATILITY variable in our regression captures these industries' effects. Our result thus agrees with Jones and Weingram (1996b) , who find that, controlling for price drops, Silicon Valley is not unusually litigation-prone. We also document a generally increasing trend of litigation probability since 1994, the base year. This period seems to coincide with the stock market bubble period: as the bubble gets bigger, there is more activity going on within firms that is the focus of subsequent litigation. These activities seem to fall off after fiscal year 2000, the year in which the bubble burst; though the decline for 2001 could simply be an indication that more lawsuits relating to that period have yet to be filed.
To summarize our analysis of the relationship between executive compensation and subsequent shareholder lawsuits, we find that firms whose executives hold more vested options and receive more new option grants are more likely to be the subject of a complaint alleging securities fraud in subsequent class action litigation. and earnings manipulation is a frequent target of SEC investigations. Table 7 provides a first look at the relationship between litigation and earnings manipulation, comparing abnormal or "discretionary" accrual activity in class and non-class firmyears. The median values of both the raw accruals (TAC and CA) and the discretionary accrual measures (DTAC and DCA) are quite similar in class and non-class firm-years. However, they are considerably more variable in class years, as reflected in the standard deviation and quartile analysis. Thus there is an unusual amount of accrual activity in class firm-years; but since it can be both negative and positive, the average level is not much affected. This is reflected in the averages of the absolute value of accruals in Table 7 : for all four measures, and in particular for the discretionary components, the mean and median absolute value is higher in class-years.
Earnings manipulation and lawsuits
A natural next question to ask is through what channel incentive-based
The statistical model we use to investigate the relation between earnings manipulation and private litigation alleging that securities violations occurred in the same year is:
Prob(CLASSYEAR t ) = F[Earnings manipulation t , SIZE t-1 , BM t-1 , LEVERAGE t-1 , VOLATILITY t-1 , Industry dummies, Year dummies]
where the measure of earnings manipulation is DCA, DTAC, |DCA| or |DTAC| respectively.
The results are given in Table 8 . |DCA| is highly significant and positive, indicating that the absolute magnitude of discretionary current accruals is significantly higher in the alleged firm-years than the non-alleged firm-years. The economic impact computed in the last column of the table shows that a change from minus one standard deviation to one plus standard deviation around the mean of |DCA| is associated with a 0.9%-point increase in the class year probability in the same period, that is, a 20% increase in the 4.5% average probability over the whole sample.
That |DCA| is significantly associated with litigation class periods, but the other earnings manipulation measures are not, raises two important issues. One is the differential impact of current and long-run accruals. The other is the role of income-increasing and income-decreasing manipulation in inducing litigation. We discuss each issue in turn.
Regarding current versus total accruals, Kreutzfeldt and Wallace (1986) and Guenther (1994) have argued that managers have greater discretion over current accruals than over long-term accruals. Teoh et al. (1998a) also find that seasoned equity issuers raise reported earnings through discretionary current accruals, while there is no significant activity in the long-term discretionary accruals. In our empirical work DTAC and |DTAC|, which include both current and long-term discretionary accruals, are not significantly related to private securities litigation, as reported in Table 8 . This suggests that although there is significant manipulation in current items during class periods, that is not so for long-term items. Indeed, most studies that investigate abnormal accruals and litigation risk, such as DuCharme et al. (2003) , Lu (2003) and Johnson, Nelson and Pritchard (2002) , focus on current accruals only, and find that discretionary current accruals are significantly associated with litigation risk. Accordingly, in the remainder of this paper we will focus on discretionary current accruals as our measure of earnings manipulation.
A striking feature of our results is that the signed measure of discretionary current accruals (DCA) is not significant whereas its absolute value |DCA| is. This suggests that although there is evidence of more active manipulation of current accruals during class period years, it can be both upward and downward, in accordance with the descriptive statistics in Table 7 . Now upward manipulation is of particular benefit to company insiders in IPO situations; our study excludes IPOs while Lu (2003) and Johnson, Nelson and Pritchard (2002) do not, and DuCharme et al. (2003) actually restrict their attention to IPOs and seasoned offerings. It is known that IPOs induce upward earnings manipulation from the work of Teoh et al. (1998b) . This may explain why studies find a significant impact of upward manipulation while we do not. Furthermore, in practice downward manipulation is not uncommon. A typical example is an excessively conservative "big bath"
restructuring charge designed to create a cushion of undervalued resources for increasing future income and creating the appearance of high growth. Similarly, unrealistically pessimistic estimates of liabilities (loan losses, warranty costs, etc.) can be used to create "cookie jar reserves", reducing earnings during good years in return for future earnings enhancement. Mulford and Comiskey's (2002, p.144 ) survey of earnings management techniques observed by financial professionals cites these two techniques in 17% of reported cases. Other practices involve excessive one-time writeoffs in the context of acquisitions, and overly conservative forecasts (where companies set themselves very undemanding targets, in order to ensure that they meet them later on). Thus in the remainder of our analysis we will restrict our attention to the absolute value of discretionary current accruals.
Executive compensation and earnings manipulation
In this section, we investigate the empirical link between executive pay variables and |DCA|, addressing the hypothesis that executive pay gives incentives for earnings manipulation. This issue has been investigated by Bergstresser and Philippon (2002) and Gao and Shrieves (2002) . Our work in this section is mainly directed towards decomposing our earnings manipulation variable into two parts, one that is and one that is not attributable to executive pay factors. These will be used as inputs into a further investigation of the determinants of private securities litigation.
As mentioned above, in our analysis we will focus on the absolute value of accruals as the measure of manipulation; Bergstresser and Philippon (2002) and Gao and Shrieves (2002) also focus on this measure. While at first sight one would expect options and bonuses to give incentives only for upward manipulation, 27 there are circumstances in which the opposite may be true. A case in point is the period preceding the granting of options, when downward manipulation of the stock price can secure a more favorable strike price. There is evidence of self-dealing behavior in earnings management and the timing of disclosures around option grants (Yermack, 1997 , Aboody and Kasznik, 2000 and Baker et al., 2003 , with favorable news delayed until after the strike prices have been determined. Another example debated in empirical work is the shifting of earnings to future years whenever bonuses are at their maximum (Healy, 1985 , Holthausen et al., 1995 , and Gaver et al., 1995 28 The BONUS and SHAREOWN variables are positive but statistically insignificant even though they reflect pay-performance sensitivity and potential incentives for manipulation.
OPTEXERCISE is significantly positive, reflecting a strong positive relationship of earnings manipulation and the executives' payoff from exercising options in the same period. Huddart and Lang (2003) find that employees tend to exercise options in advance of low short-term stock returns; our results suggest that deliberate manipulation may be a contributing factor. OPTGRANT is also significantly positive, consistent with the work of Yermack (1997) The results in Table 9 show that incentive variables, together with other control variables, explain 15% of the variation in the magnitude of discretionary current accruals. This explanatory power is quite large, especially given that the dependant variable |DCA| is estimated from regressions (see appendix for details) and thus is measured with error, imparting a downward bias to the R squared and the t statistics. Tables 7 and 8 showed that earnings manipulation (as measured by the absolute value of discretionary current accruals) is associated with the incidence of securities class action; and Table   9 and b 4 through b 9 are estimated from equation (5), and reported in the last column of For example, earnings management may be used to give a more realistic picture of long-term prospects, to secure credit on better terms, to discourage market entry by competitors, etc.
Incentives, earnings manipulation and litigation
The next issue to be addressed is whether earnings manipulation is the only channel through which executive compensation impacts subsequent litigation. The securities laws apply to false and misleading statements in general, not just to accounting violations. There are many forms of misinformation (overoptimistic projections, product hype, failure to disclose problems securing new debt capital, misleading remarks to analysts or investors, etc.) that are not directly accountingrelated. Thus many securities lawsuits could well be unrelated to accounting violations. In addition, the estimated variable we used to capture aggressive accounting is quite noisy and imperfect.
Therefore a direct statistical relationship between compensation and litigation, over and above that mediated by observable aggressive accounting variables, is not excluded.
The model we estimate is: (8) where the coefficient of either the compensation variables or of |DCA| are set to zero. In order to compare results consistently across these three models, we only include the 10947 observations where all variables in equation (8) are not missing.
Industry dummies, Year dummies]
Comparing the general fit of models 1 and model 2, we see that the executive compensation variables are better predictors of CLASSYEAR than earnings manipulation measures. This is not surprising, given that our earnings manipulation measures are noisy and moreover, as we saw from Table 10 , compensation-driven manipulation is a dominant force in explaining securities class action litigation. However, likelihood ratio tests reject both restricted models in favor of the full regression, model 3.
In that model, the compensation variables OPTVESTED t-1 and OPTUNVESTED t-1 and the earnings manipulation measure |DCA t | are significant and positive. That model 1 is rejected suggests that either (1) the incentives from executive compensation contracts may prompt non-accounting related deception or securities fraud that is also important in predicting lawsuits, or (2) our earnings manipulation measure |DCA t | is very noisy and does not adequately capture all accounting manipulations, or both. That model 2 is rejected suggests that there are motives for accounting manipulation that triggers lawsuits that we do not capture with our compensation variables.
Conclusion
Our paper finds that there is a significant relationship between executive compensation and shareholder class action litigation, and that this relationship is to some extent mediated by manipulative accounting practices. We find that incentive pay in the form of options significantly increases the probability of a shareholder class action lawsuit making allegations about the firm's activities in the subsequent year, controlling for a wide range of other firm characteristics. In contrast, base pay levels and executive share ownership do not have a significant impact on lawsuit incidence.
We further examine whether earnings manipulation, as measured by estimated discretionary current accruals, is an important channel for this phenomenon. Incentive pay does have a significant impact on our measure of earnings manipulation, which in turn significantly affects the probability of litigation. However, this mechanism does not account for the full impact of compensation on litigation, suggesting that other channels may also be important. Conversely, we also document that some litigation is associated with earnings manipulation activity that does not seem to be directly related to managers' compensation contracts.
Our results suggest that the fast-vesting options that represent a substantial component of current executive pay may give managers perverse incentives to self-deal by, for example, manipulating earnings, and that such misbehavior ultimately triggers shareholder class action lawsuits. A natural conclusion is that incentive compensation contracts should focus more on longterm incentives. The optimal design of such contracts is an important direction for economic research.
In addition, our results are relevant to the current policy debate on how to make private securities litigation a more effective deterrence mechanism. We find that such litigation is triggered by both managerial self-dealing and the underlying incentives for it, a necessary condition for an effective disciplinary role. But there is widespread concern that most class action lawsuits are settled on terms that provide insufficient sanctions for executive malfeasance, as the costs are largely borne by the company, its investors and D&O insurers.
In terms of avenues for further research, constructing and incorporating alternative measures of the sensitivity of executive pay to performance would be potentially rewarding. Similarly, a broad array of alternative indicators of securities violations and their relation to executive compensation are worth investigating.
Appendix 1: Construction of earnings manipulation measures
The method used to estimate discretionary accruals follows Teoh et al. (1998a) , a cross-sectional adaptation of a modified Jones model. All numbering of items refers to the Compustat data item numbers).
Current accrual (or working capital accruals):
To construct discretionary current accruals, we estimate the following regression for each of the 12 industries each year:
where TA is total assets (data item 6), ∆SALES is the change in sales (data item 12), and ∆TR is the change in trade receivables (data item 151).
Total accruals: TAC = CA+LA (long term accruals) = Net Income (172)-Cash Flow from Operations (308) To construct discretionary total accruals, we estimate the following regression for each of the 12 industries each year: -2519,2590-2599,3630-3659,3710-3711,3714-3714,3716-3716,3750-3751,3792-3792,3900-3939,3990-3999) Paper, Com Printing (2520 -2589 ,2600 -2699 ,2750 -2769 Software, [3694] [3695] [3696] [3697] [3698] [3699] [3810] [3811] [3812] [3813] [3814] [3815] [3816] [3817] [3818] [3819] [3820] [3821] [3822] [3823] [3824] [3825] [3826] [3827] [3828] [3829] [7370] [7371] [7372] [7373] [7374] [7375] [7376] [7377] [7378] [7379] BM is the ratio of book equity to market capitalization of the firm. LEVERAGE is the ratio of total debt to total assets. VOLATILITY is the annualized standard deviation of daily stock returns for a fiscal year. i1 -i11 are the 11 industry dummies; the default is industry 12. yr1995 -yr2001 are the year dummies; 1994 is the default year. The t-statistics are computed using Huber/White/sandwich robust standard errors allowing for firm level serial correlation. ∆Prob is the change in the c.d.f. when the independent variable changes from minus one standard deviation to plus one standard deviation around its mean, holding other variables constant at their respective means. For dummy variables, ∆Prob is the difference in the c.d.f. when the dummy variable changes from 0 to 1. The last three rows provide the number of observations, the observed probability of CLASSYEAR=1, and various test statistics. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and *** respectively. LEVERAGE is the ratio of total debt to total assets. VOLATILITY is the annualized standard deviation of daily stock returns for a fiscal year. i1 -i11 are the 11 industry dummies, the default is industry 12. yr1995 -yr2001 are the year dummies, the default year is 1994. The t-statistics are computed with Huber/White/sandwich robust standard errors allowing for firm level serial correlation. ∆Prob is the change in the c.d.f. when the independent variable changes from minus one standard deviation to plus one standard deviation around its mean, holding other variables constant at their respective means. For dummy variables, ∆Prob is the difference in the c.d.f. when the dummy variable changes from 0 to 1. The last four rows provides the number of observations, the observed probability of CLASSYEAR=1, and various test statistics. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and *** respectively. BM is the ratio of book equity to market capitalization. LEVERAGE is the ratio of total debt to total assets. VOLATILITY is the annualized standard deviation of daily stock returns for a fiscal year. i1 -i11 are 11 industry dummies; the default is industry 12. yr1995-yr2001 are the year dummies, the default year is 1994. The t-statistics are computed using Huber/White/sandwich robust standard errors allowing for firm level serial correlation. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and *** respectively.
Coef. (5), and |DCA| e is the remaining |DCA|. SIZE is the logarithm of the market capitalization of the firm. BM is the ratio of book equity to market capitalization. LEVERAGE is the ratio of total debt to total assets. VOLATILITY is the annualized standard deviation of daily stock returns for a fiscal year. i1 -i11 are the 11 industry dummies, with industry 12 the default. yr1995 -yr2001 are the year dummies, the default year is 1994. The t-statistics are computed using Huber/White/sandwich robust standard errors allowing for firm level serial correlation. ∆Prob is the change in the c.d.f. when the independent variable changes from minus one standard deviation to plus one standard deviation around its mean, holding other variables constant at their respective means. For dummy variables, ∆Prob is the difference in the c.d.f. when the dummy variable changes from 0 to 1. The last four rows provide the number of observations, the observed probability of CLASSYEAR=1, and various test statistics. The LR tests are the likelihood ratio tests against model 3. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and *** respectively. and OPTEXERCISE are the number of exercisable options, unexercisable options, new options granted, and options exercised, all as percentages of total shares outstanding. |DCA| is the absolute value of discretionary current accruals. SIZE is the logarithm of the market capitalization of the firm. bm is the ratio of book equity to market capitalization of the firm. LEVERAGE is the ratio of total debt to total assets. VOLATILITY is the annualized standard deviation of daily stock returns for a fiscal year. i1~i11 are the 11 industry dummies, industry 12 is the default. yr1995~yr2001 are the year dummies, the default year is 1994. The t-statistics are computed using Huber/White/sandwich robust standard errors allowing for firm level serial correlation. The last five rows provide the number of observations, the observed probability of CLASSYEAR=1, and various test statistics. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and *** respectively. 
